1943 by John Grigg
The Victory That Never Was

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1943: THE VICTORY THAT NEVER WAS is a brilliant and fascinating account of the Second World War and the crucial military decisions of 1943. In this controversial book Grigg reveals major Allied miscalculations in prosecuting the war, contending that the most important military decision of the war in Europe--the timing of the Allied invasion of France--was a major blunder. Using the latest available sources, Grigg argues that had the assault taken place in 1943 rather than 1944, the savings in lives and materials would have been very great and the nature of the ultimate Allied victory would have profoundly altered the political scene in postwar Europe. Grigg analyzes the delay of the second front within the context of the entire war. For instance, the strategy determined at the summit meeting at Casablanca--to invade Sicily and Italy, the "soft underbelly" of Europe--resulted in a tremendous waste of time, lives, money, and effort. Equally important, it delayed the invasion of France for a year. Human fallibility played an important role in these decisions. General Marshall, who rightly believed that an Allied cross-Channel invasion made at the earliest possible moment was the only way to defeat the Nazis, let himself be overruled. Franklin Roosevelt and much of the American establishment were implacably opposed to Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French. Churchill succumbed to the American obsession, and the Mediterranean was given priority. The futile attempt to bring Germany to her knees by terror-bombing was yet another miscalculation. The tragic mistakes John Grigg reveals are usually glossed over by military historians. The truth is that these errors lengthened the war and also created many of the political problems that still face us.

About John Grigg

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Published January 1, 1980 by Hill & Wang Pub. 248 pages
Genres: History, War.