The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II by David M. Glantz

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Aimed at serious students of modern military warfare, this dry examination of Soviet intelligence gathering/analysis and its effect on political-military decision making during WW II has a well-defined subject but lacks a theme or argument. Glantz begins the study with a discussion of Soviet unpreparedness at the time of the German invasion in 1941, then traces the strategic misjudgments imposed by Stalin on the high command during the first few months of the war, resulting in a series of military disasters that lasted until the autumn of 1942 when the Red Army seized the initiative at Stalingrad. The author describes how the Soviets learned to detect German intentions, provide the enemy with false information, and mask Red Army counteroffensive plans only after Stalin began to pay heed to the advice of his staff.

About David M. Glantz

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David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House have collaborated on all three volumes of the Stalingrad Trilogy, as well as on the books When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler and The Battle of Kursk. A retired U. S. Army colonel fluent in Russian, Glantz is the author of numerous books, including The Battle for Leningrad, 19411944; Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, and Red Storm over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania. House is the author of Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century.
Published July 10, 1990 by Presidio Pr. 262 pages
Genres: History, War. Non-fiction

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